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In this article, we use data collected from municipal council members and department heads in Michigan municipal-
ities with over 10 000 residents to determine how, and why, they view the quality of their interactions with one
another. Building theories of small group dynamics and political control of bureaucracy, we test several hypotheses
and conclude that council members and department heads hold divergent views of their interactions with one another
and that their views are determined by government form and community characteristics. We conclude with simple
steps that local government officials and administrators can take to improve their small group dynamics and
governing performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between elected officials and gov-
ernment employees has long been of core interest
to scholars of public administration. Woodrow
Wilson’s (1887) seminal essay philosophically en-
grained the complex relationship between political
and administrative actors into the very foundation
of the field. Others, including Frederickson (1980)
and Svara (1990), built on Wilson’s ideas using
practical models explaining political control over the
bureaucracy (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari
2012). In this article, we apply theories of small group
dynamics to the question of political control over
bureaucracy. Theories of small group dynamics,
broadly, posit that the quality of group interactions
in an organizational setting impact the overall per-
formance of an organization (Golembiewski 1995;
Gabris, Golembiewski, & Ihrke 2001; Gabris and
Nelson 2013; Ford and Ihrke 2015). At its simplest,
organizations exhibiting positive group dynamics
obtain better outcomes than organizations with neg-
ative group dynamics. Specifically, we use data col-
lected from council members and department heads
serving in Michigan local governments to answer
two research questions:
1) How do city council members and department
heads view their interactions with one another?
And
2) What are the structural determinants of council
member and department head perceptions of
council–department head interactions?
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Currently, there are 275 municipalities overseen
by elected council members in the state of Michigan.
The focus of this study is the one-third of Michigan
municipalities with populations of over 10 000.
We focus on larger municipalities because of the
logical assumption that larger municipalities have
greater needs and provide a wider array of services
than smaller municipalities. Other studies of local
government by Moon (2002), Heidbreder, Grasse,
Ihrke, and Cherry (2011), and Nelson and Svara
(2012) have similarly focused on this population
of American municipalities. As mentioned, in this
study, we explore the relationship between elected
city council members and department heads. We be-
gin with a basic question, what do council members
and department heads do, respectively?
Under the classic politics–administration dichot-
omy, elected municipal council members set policies
that articulate the goals of the organization and
leave it up to the administrators to execute those
goals (Goodnow 1900). However, as Svara (1990)
famously noted, city council members are, in reality,
involved in mission setting, policy design, general
administration, and day-to-day management to a
degree that is determined in part by the nature
and structure of the local government. Nonetheless,
municipal councils can broadly be understood as
the body serving the legislative function of munici-
pal government. As such, their work product in-
cludes the setting of policies that establish the
rules of the municipality, that is, ordinances, and
policies that set the rules governing the operations
of the organization. Generically, their tasks can be
described as governance.
City council members engage in the task of gover-
nance as small groups of people meeting at legally
established intervals. The group dynamics on a city
council, including the level of conflict, cooperation,
openness, and trust, have been shown to be influ-
enced by the structural characteristics of the govern-
ment (Nelson & Nollenberger 2011), as well as the
demographics of the board member themselves
(Ihrke & Niederjohn 2005). In other words, the task
of governance is shared among board members
who bring with them a diversity of experience,
goals, and constituencies. Although often elected
in non-partisan elections, municipal council mem-
bers are still political animals elected to represent
the interests of their constituents. Hence, each coun-
cil member has both an internal audience, that is,
the rest of the council, and an external audience,
that is, the voters. The competing audience pres-
sures further complicate the governance process by
forcing members to work with other members
who may have a very different governing mandate.
Municipal council members also interact with the
executive office of their local government. In a
council–manager system, council members, in per-
haps their most important task, hire the city man-
ager. Once hired, it is up to the council to evaluate
his or her performance and ultimately hold the
manager accountable for the performance of their
government (Svara 1987; 1999). In a mayor–council
system in which the executive is elected, the exec-
utive faces the same competing audience challenge
as the council members, likely further politicizing
the relationship between the council and the exe-
cutive. Such a system creates a higher conflict
balance of power relationship as opposed to a co-
operative shared governance relationship (Nelson
& Nollenberger 2011). Regardless of government
form, managing the relationship with the executive
is a key governing task of a municipal council.
Municipal councils have a less direct relationship
with the department heads that serve at the behest
of the local government executive. While the council,
executive, andmanagers working within government
are all impacting the overall performance of local gov-
ernment and have a shared interest in its success, the
level of interaction between the council and depart-
ment heads is, by design, less that the level of interac-
tion between the council and the executive or the
executive and the department heads, respectively. De-
partment heads serve the more traditional manage-
ment function of overseeing employees working in
local government. Under the traditional politics–
administration dichotomy, department heads are
firmly on the administrative side, assigning tasks to
employees in order to meet the policy goals set by
the council. Department heads report to the executive,
and although they serve the public, are not the pub-
lic’s accountability point in local government. Finally,
department heads also interact with one another as
peerswith similar operational tasks by virtue of sitting
in parallel positions within the bureaucracy.
As stated, we are interested in the ways in which
department heads and council members view their
interactions with one another. We suspect, given
the differences in their respective tasks and audi-
ences, that they have differing views on the quality
and effectiveness of their interactions. But why
does it matter if council members and department
heads are on the same page as it pertains to their
interactions? First, theories of political control of
bureaucracy explain how both the political and ad-
ministrative actors within local government share
the task of running government (Svara 1994). Under
Svara (1994), mission, policy, administration, and
management of government are shared, to some de-
gree, between the council and the administrators.
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The public administration axiom, which politics
decides and administration does, only works if both
groups are on the same page. If not, the day-to-day
execution of government will not reflect the goals of
elected officials and, in turn, the voting public.
Related, according to theories of small group
dynamics, the effectiveness of an organization will
be less than ideal if members of the organization
do not have accurate views of one another (Gabris
et al. 2001; Grasse, Heidbreder, & Ihrke 2014). Sim-
ply, a disconnect between two groups necessary to
the effective functioning of government can be ex-
pected to have a negative impact on overall govern-
ment performance.
HYPOTHESES
In this section, we present and explain the rationale
for five hypotheses grounded in theories of political
control of bureaucracy and small group dynamics.
Hypothesis 1: Council members have different views
of the council member–department head relationship
than department heads.
As discussed, council members and department
heads differ in their core functions and contribu-
tions to the governance of their municipalities. Ide-
ally, under a healthy group dynamic, both groups
would be expected to take a similar view of their
relationship. However, we suspect that the indirect
relationship between the two groups, along with
the existence of the intermediary government exec-
utive, makes it unlikely that they share common
perceptions of their relationship.
Hypothesis 2: Council members and department
heads in council–manager forms of government have
comparatively more positive views of the council
member–department head relationship.
Svara (1999) and Nelson and Nollenberger (2011)
found that council–manager government forms re-
sulted in overall lower levels of conflict between
board members and between board members and
the executive. We suspect that the effect of govern-
ment form on conflict carries over into the council
member–department head relationship.
Hypothesis 3: Council members and department
heads serving municipalities with more challenging
demographics have comparatively more negative views
of the council member–department head relationship.
Peterson (1976), Johnson and Ihrke (2004), Ihrke
and Niederjohn (2005), Ford and Ihrke (2015),
and others demonstrated that the group dynamics
on governing boards are impacted by the demo-
graphics of the population served by the local
government. Generally, when populations have
higher needs, as evidenced by higher rates of pov-
erty, urbanity, and others, the governing task is more
complicated, creatingmore opportunities for conflict
(Peterson 1981). We suspect the negative impact of
higher need populations on governing dynamics
carries over into the council–member department
head relationship. We suspect this relationship to
be particularly acute for department heads, given
their close proximity to the populations being served
by government (Lipsky, 2010).
Hypothesis 4: Longer serving council members and
department heads have a comparably more positive view
of the council member–department head relationship.
Logically, the longer one serves in a local govern-
ment, the more time they have to develop relation-
ships with their colleagues and subordinates.
Previous research on Wisconsin town boards con-
ducted by Johnson and Ihrke (2004) found that
tenure was a negative predictor of conflict. We
similarly expect longer serving board members
and department heads to exhibit comparably more
positive perceptions of their interactions with one
another.
Hypothesis 5: Council members and department heads
serving municipalities receiving higher levels of state fi-
nancial support have comparably higher perceptions of
the quality of their interactions.
Shared revenue consists of the redistribution of
state tax revenues to municipal governments. We
suspect that council member and department heads
serving governments receiving comparably more
shared revenue have higher perceptions of their
quality their interactions. Why? Presumably, the
availability of resources allows both parties to better
execute their shared governance task, resulting in
positive perceptions of one another.
DATA AND METHODS
The data used to test our hypotheses come from a
2006 survey of 1430 public officials representing 92
Michigan municipalities with more than 10000 citi-
zens. The survey, which targeted council members
and department heads, as well as mayors and city
managers, had a response rate of 31.1%. In addition,
data were obtained from at least one city council
member in 90% of the targeted municipalities.
While the survey data are somewhat dated, this
study’s focus on group dynamics and political
Government interactions 3
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control of bureaucracy gives us confidence that the
results are not substantively impacted by the year
in which the data was collected; there is no reason
to believe that the state of Michigan municipalities
have drastically changed in ways that would be
expected to impact their governing dynamics.
All survey data were matched with various mu-
nicipal demographic and structural characteristics
obtained from the United States Census and
Citizens Research Council of Michigan. The sur-
vey questions themselves were heavily informed
by previous municipal surveys in Wisconsin con-
ducted by Johnson and Ihrke (2004) and Ihrke
and Niederjohn (2005).
Summary statistics for the independent variables
used in our analysis, disaggregated by group, are
displayed in Table 1. Length of service and age are
both individual variables measured by our survey
instrument. Percentage of White people, obtained
from the United States census bureau, measures
the percentage of residents within a municipality
whom identify as white. Persons per square mile,
also census data, is a measure of density that indi-
cates both the size and urbanity of a municipality.
Population over 65%, per capita income, occupied
housing, and poverty rate (all obtained from the
census) are measures of the relative governance
challenge, as indicated by the demographics of the
municipality’s population, facing council members
and department heads. Shared revenue, obtained
from the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, in-
dicates the amount of state financial support given
to the municipal government in the 2005 fiscal year.
Not listed in Table 1 is a dichotomous variable indi-
cating if the council member or department head is
serving a council–manager form of government.
One hundred and thirteen of the 160 council mem-
bers in our sample, about 71%, are serving a
council–manager government. About 72% of the
surveyed department heads, 165 out of 230, work
for council–manager governments.
Summary statistics for the focal variables, all of
which measure the quality of interactions between
council members and municipal staff, are displayed
in Table 2. Both council members and department
heads were asked to state their level of agreement
on a five-point Likert scale with six different state-
ments, where 1= complete disagreement and
5=complete agreement. Statement 1 is a generic
measurement of the extent to which communication
between city council and municipal staff is per-
ceived as effective. Statement 2 measures the extent
to which city council members are perceived to be
micromanaging administrative units. Statement 3
measures the extent to which administrators are
perceived to be faithfully carrying out the policies
passed by the council. Statement 4 measures percep-
tions of teamwork between the council and admin-
istration. Statement 5 is an indicator of the extent
to which administrative staff is seen as feeling com-
fortable interacting with the council. Statement 6
measures the perceived extent to which the council
is seen as making realistic demands on the staff.
All six statements are based on previous research
on conflict in municipal government (Johnson &
Ihrke 2004; Ihrke & Niederjohn 2005). Lastly, we cre-
ated an additive index variable based on responses
to statements 1–6, where Statement 2, as the only
negative statement, is reverse coded. The interaction
additive index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 and
0.79 for council members and department heads,
respectively.
We test hypothesis 1, which states that depart-
ment heads and council member have different
perceptions of their interactions, using a series of
two-sample comparison of means tests. The results,
displayed in Table 3, mostly support the hypothesis.
Council members are more likely than department
Table 1 Summary statistics for independent variables
N Mean Standard deviation
Council Dept. heads Council Dept. heads Council Dept. heads
Length of service 156 225 7.33 9.87 6.19 7.96
Age 160 224 51.86 50.00 11.06 7.53
Percentage of White people 160 230 83.46 83.50 16.26 16.67
Persons per square mile 160 230 3359.24 3267.61 1684.85 1685.88
Population over 65 160 230 5678.68 5671.17 8740.32 7763.73
Per capita income 160 230 23 275.04 22 418.33 9044.80 7501.99
Shared revenue 160 230 6 241 652 5 622 769 2.25e+07 1.89e+07
Percentage of occupied housing 160 230 94.75 94.77 2.21 2.39
Poverty rate 160 230 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08
4 M. R. Ford et al.
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heads to view communications between council
members and administrators as effective, to view
the council and administrators as a team, believe
that staff feel comfortable interacting with the coun-
cil, and believe the council makes realistic demands
on staff. Council members also have statistically
higher values on the previously described additive
index variable. Department heads are more likely
than city council members to agree that adminis-
trators faithfully carry out policies consistent
with the intentions of municipal councils. There
is no statistical difference between the level of
agreement and Statement 2, which measures per-
ceptions of micromanaging by the municipal
council. Overall, council members tend to agree
more than department heads with statements that
speak highly of the council, while department
heads have comparatively higher levels of agree-
ment with the statement that speaks more highly
of municipal managers.
We test the remaining three hypotheses using two
ordinary least squares regression models, where the
interaction index is the dependent variable. To pre-
vent the possibility of common source bias, all inde-
pendent variables included in the analysis are either
individual respondent demographic variables or
municipal characteristic variables (Favero & Bullock
2015). Regression diagnostics revealed no evidence
of colinearity or heteroskedasticty. The regression
results are displayed in Table 4. As can be seen,
Model 1 predicts the interaction index for the
sample of council members, while Model 2 predicts
Table 2 Summary statistics for focal variables








Statement 1: Communications between the city council and
administrative units/administrators is frequent and effective.
157 220 3.49 3.06 1.27 1.25
Statement 2: City council members frequently meddle in the
operation of administrative departments.
156 221 2.84 3.05 1.11 1.00
Statement 3: When the council makes decisions,
administrators faithfully carry out the policy according to
council intentions.
156 221 3.67 3.96 1.03 0.77
Statement 4: On balance, the council views its relationship
with administrators as a team.
157 220 3.67 3.32 1.02 1.14
Statement 5: Staff feels comfortable interacting with
the council.
155 220 3.56 3.23 0.99 1.13
Statement 6: The council makes realistic demands on staff. 156 220 3.74 3.25 0.79 0.94
Interaction index variable 152 219 21.24 19.75 4.31 4.43





Statement 1: Communications between the city council and administrative units/
administrators is frequent and effective.
3.49 3.06 3.97***
Statement 2: City council members frequently meddle in the operation of
administrative departments.
2.84 3.05 1.63
Statement 3: When the council makes decisions, administrators faithfully carry
out the policy according to council intentions.
3.67 3.96 3.20**
Statement 4: On balance, the council views its relationship with administrators as
a team.
3.67 3.32 3.08**
Statement 5: Staff feels comfortable interacting with the council. 3.56 3.23 2.92**
Statement 6: The council makes realistic demands on staff. 3.74 3.25 5.31***
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the interaction index for the sample of department
heads.
Hypothesis 2 states that the council–manager
form of government is linked to more positive
views of the council member–department head rela-
tionship. The hypothesis is supported by Model 1
but not Model 2, meaning that council members
serving in council–manager governments have a
more positive perception of the council member–
department head relationship, while department
heads do not. The results for the sample of council
members are also substantively significant; council
members serving in council–manager forms of gov-
ernment have an interaction index score that is 2.145
points higher on a scale ranging from 11 to 30.
Hypothesis 3 states that council members and
departments serving municipalities with more
challenging demographics have comparably more
negative views of the council member–department
head relationship. Both regression models indicate
limited support for this hypothesis. First, urbanity
and size, as measured by census data indicating
persons per square mile within a municipality, have
a statistically significant negative relationship with
the interaction index variable in both models.
Meaning, both council members and department
heads serving municipalities with higher densities
have comparably more negative perceptions of
council member–department head interactions.
However, the size of the relationship is substan-
tively small; in both models, a change of one
standard deviation in the independent variable
changes the dependent variable by less than one
point. In addition, Model 2 reveals a negative rela-
tionship between the population over the age of
65years and the interaction index and a positive
relationship between the percentage of occupied
housing and the interaction index. While the rela-
tionship between an aged population and the inter-
action index is substantively small, the relationship
between occupied housing and the interaction index
is substantively significant, with a 2.42 percentage
point increase in occupied housing corresponding
with a one-point increase in the interaction index.
Interestingly, neither poverty nor per capita income
are significantly related to the dependent variable in
either model.
Hypothesis 4 states that longer serving council
members and department heads have a more posi-
tive view of their relationship with one another. In
neither model do we find any support for hypothe-
sis 4. Finally, hypothesis 5 states that higher levels of
state financial support, measured by the amount of
shared revenue sent to the municipality, are linked
with higher scores on the interaction index. While
there is no significant relationship in Model 1,
Model 2 does indicate that department heads re-
ceiving more shared revenue do have a more posi-
tive view of council member–department head
interactions. However, the relationship is substan-
tively small.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we set out to answer two research
questions, the first being: How do city council mem-
bers and department heads view their interactions
with one another? Our data from Michigan munici-
pal council members and department heads reveal
that the two groups have divergent view of the
qualities of their interactions with one another. In
the context of the small group dynamics literature,
this divergence of views is problematic; if two
groups crucial to effective governance do not have
an accurate portrayal of each other, the local govern-
ment is likely not operating as effectively as possible
(Gabris & Nelson 2013; Grissom 2010, 2014). How-
ever, the divergence of views is not surprising given
the lack of regular interactions between council
Table 4 Ordinary least squares regression results

















Population over 65 0.000112 0.000229**
(0.000101) (8.39e05)
Per capita income 9.70e06 9.50e05
(4.97e05) (5.26e05)
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members and department heads. In addition, the
ways in which council members and department
heads differ in their opinions of their interactions
are logical. Council members more readily agree
with statements that speak highly of the perfor-
mance of the council, while department heads more
readily agree with the statement that speaks more
highly of municipal administrators. This finding
speaks to a bias in favor of the group with which
respondents identify and work.
The answer to our second research question
‘What are the structural determinants of council
member and department head perceptions of
council–department head interactions?’ similarly
speaks to the divide between council members and
department heads. First, in the Michigan case, the
group dynamic benefit of council–manager form
only applies to the perception of council members.
Those serving in this form of government have sub-
stantially more positive views of their interactions
with municipal administration. However, the fact
that the positive influence of the council–manager
form does not carry over into the perceptions of
department heads adds a layer of complexity to
the relationship between government form and its
effects on the group dynamics of local government
(Ihrke & Niederjohn 2005; Nelson & Nollenberger
2011). Future research focused on how local govern-
ment form affects department head performance
could shed more light onto the possible implications
of this finding.
Generally, we find that the municipal characteris-
tics likely to impact the actual day-to-day tasks of
department heads are most influential in explaining
their perceptions of interactions with the council.
Resources, defined as both shared revenue and the
percentage of occupied housing, which is an indica-
tor of a healthier tax-base, is the key determinant of
department head impressions of council–admi-
nistration interactions. While council members are
no doubt impacted by the availability of resources,
their day-to-day is more impacted by their inter-
actions with the government executive, some-
thing that is controlled by government form.
The lack of substantive findings regarding the
impact of poverty and per capital income on
perceptions of department head–council member
interactions is surprising. The absence of a strong
relationship between governing characteristics
and the interaction index suggests that resource
availability is more important in defining interac-
tion perceptions than the extent of the governance
challenge.
There are, of course, important weaknesses in
our findings. First and foremost, the presented
regression models explain a small percentage of
the total variation in the interaction index,
20.4% and 13.5%, respectively. Although visual
inspection shows that the residuals are not corre-
lated with the error term, there are clearly addi-
tional factors at play in defining this crucial
relationship. In particular, we suspect that the
nature of the relationship between the executive
and both department heads and council mem-
bers impacts the interactions between council
members and department heads. Future research
that incorporates this key factor is a logical topic
of future research. In addition, our study focuses
only on one state, research on local government
interactions in other states, particularly those
with very different political and structural char-
acteristics, would speak to the generalizability
of our findings. Finally, studies directly linking
the interaction between these two groups with
hard measures of government performance
would speak to the importance of promoting
small group dynamics in local government.
Broadly, we conclude that department heads and
municipal council members have divergent views of
the quality of their interactions with each other and
that their perceptions are influenced by characteris-
tics of their government and community. Thus begs
the question, what can these two groups do to
ensure that they are on the same page? One simple
step is joint strategic planning sessions that incorpo-
rate the importance of the council member–
department head relationship. A simple diagnostic
tool that asks each group to rate their interaction
and then discusses where they are different and
why would force both groups to have a common
view of their interactions. Given the effects of
positive group dynamics identified by Grissom
(2014) and Ford and Ihrke (2015), such a step
should be expected to lead to real gains in public
performance.
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